Recreational fishing, by both local residents and tourists, is a popular activity globally. The behaviour and motivation of recreational fishers is different from those of commercial fishers. Unlike the latter, the former are not dependent on making profits to continue fishing. Rather, the value of recreational fishing to those who engage in it is a combination of catches and experience values. The latter value implies that recreational fishers might continue fishing when they should not, analogous to the effect of subsidy in the commercial fishing sector. Hence, the term "self-subsidizing": a fishery as one in which fishers subsidize themselves through an economic investment in gear and time from their non-fishery-based earnings. The consequence of which is that recreational fishers can continue fishing long after the commercial fishing industry has stopped fishing because their operations have become economically unviable. There is reason to argue that in many areas, recreational fishing effort, due to the self-subsidizing mechanism, is sustained at a high rate while stocks decrease. In this contribution, we describe the innate self-subsidizing forces in recreational fishing and discuss their implications.
Introduction
Coastal areas are subject to the highest pressure from human activities, resulting in degraded habitats and decreased biomass and diversity (Jackson et al., 2001) . The widespread collapse of fish stocks in coastal ecosystems due to overfishing has been confirmed repeatedly (Pauly et al., 1998; Jackson et al., 2001; Myers and Worm, 2003; Worm et al., 2006) . Measures to combat overfishing have been thoroughly discussed (Pauly et al., 2002; Gell and Roberts, 2003; Halpern, 2003; Worm et al., 2006; Francis et al., 2007; Hilborn, 2007) . One important driving factor for overfishing has been the weighty subsidy of the commercial fishing industry, where "taxes from outside the fisheries sector are used to maintain fishing at levels that are biologically and economically unsustainable, and which ultimately lead to the depletion and collapse of the underlying resources" (Pauly et al., 2002; Sumaila et al., 2008) . Recreational fishing is a popular activity globally, including fishing by local residents and tourists. In recent decades, recreational fishing and its relation to overfishing and biological impacts has gained some needed attention (Schroeder and Love, 2002; Coleman et al., 2004; Cooke and Cowx, 2004; Lewin et al., 2006; Ihde et al., 2011) . The activity is mostly conducted in close vicinity to the coast, resulting in concentration of effort in relatively small areas. High fishing intensity from recreational fishers has been observed on coastal populations that are overfished (Coleman et al., 2004; Kleiven et al., 2012 Kleiven et al., , 2016 Nillos-Kleiven et al., 2019) . Moreover, evidence exist that recreational catches for certain species can exceed commercial catches (Schroeder and Love, 2002; Coleman et al., 2004;  V C International Council for the Exploration of the Sea 2019. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com ICES Journal of Marine Science (2019), doi:10.1093/icesjms/fsz128 Kleiven et al., 2012 Kleiven et al., , 2016 . Lewin et al. (2006) argued that there is a growing body of evidence indicating that activities related to recreational fishing can "lead to a decline of fish populations and affect aquatic ecosystems if the degree of fishing mortality is high and the selective exploitation is intensive." There is now an extensive body of literature pertaining to recreational fishing, both theoretical and empirical.
Commercial and recreational fisheries often target the same fish populations, and management must handle both activities to secure sustainability. The innate differences in driving forces between a commercial fishery seeking profit and livelihoods and a non-profit-motivated recreational fishery warrant further discussion. While a commercial fishery will cease when fishing is no longer profitable, recreational fisheries have the potential to continue fishing since the activity is not driven by economical revenue.
Fishing without fear of bankruptcy
Commercial fishers depend on profit from their fishery. Motivations for recreational fishing are not solely dependent on the value of expected catches. Reasons to fish are a combination of factors related to recreational values, such as enjoying a quality environment and feeling a sense of freedom (Holland and Ditton, 1992) , as well as catch and consumption (Cooke et al., 2018) . In Richards Bay, South Africa, Beckley et al. (2008) found that recreation was the main motivation to go fishing for 99% of anglers. Furthermore, catch-per-unit-effort (CPUE) for retained fish was as low as 0.064 fish angler À1 h À1 . Based on the reasons why people go fishing, it could be expected that a decrease in CPUE will not affect effort by recreational fishers in the same way as for commercial fisheries, as observed by Post et al. (2002) in Canadian lakes. In other words, recreational fishers harbour a potential to continue fishing after the commercial fishery has stopped fishing due to low and economically unsustainable catches. In a social-ecological modelling study, Hunt et al. (2011) examined effects of angling on landscape patterns of overfishing and found responses ranging from self-regulating systems to sequential collapse of walleye fisheries in Canadian lakes, based on highly variable drivers of angler behaviour. They noted that in their model, only very remote fish stocks would be saved from substantial overharvest when regional fishing pressure increased critically to a high level. At some point, one should expect recreational fishers to quit fishing and move on to alternative activities when catch rates hit a critically low level. However, decisions based on such "opportunity costs" of activities will vary in space and time. As shown by Beckley et al. (2008) , recreational fishers in Richards Bay were fishing even though catch rates were very low. Tolerable catch rates will vary between different fisheries, but it is hard to predict such behaviour for a recreational fishery. The motivation for-and satisfaction of a fishing trip can change in time, for example due to shifting baselines (sensu Pauly, 1995) : catching one fish in the present day might generate the same satisfaction-and motivation for continued fishing-as catching three fish on a fishing trip one generation ago, if other non-catchrelated values have remained high. Lovell et al. (2016) estimated that recreational saltwater fishers in the US spent $28 billion on fishing equipment and durable goods in 2014. Recently, Hyder et al. (2018) estimated the total expenditure on European marine recreational fisheries to be e5.9 billion annually. Investments in new and better gear (rods, lures, bigger boat, GPS chart-plotter, acoustic fish-finder, etc.) can contribute to technological creep in the recreational fishery with potential to sustain catch rates while stocks are decreasing. Technological creep seems to occur within all types of commercial fisheries (Pauly and Palomares, 2010) and there is reason to expect a similar trend within the recreational sector. Meanwhile, studies addressing technological creep in recreational fisheries are limited, if at all existing. However, not only direct expenditures should be included in estimates of investment in recreational fishing. Time is another expenditure related to the activity. Recreational fishers have no direct economic expenses linked to time spent fishing, in contrast to commercial fishers for whom salaries must be derived and paid to themselves or to crew members. Recreational fishers are using their spare time to fish for the sake of recreation. They can therefore invest a lot of their time in fishing without high economic risk and are in no need to make a profit. Putting it another way: recreational fishers can spend a whole day catching one fish without fear of bankruptcy.
Conversely, commercial fishing operations fish for profit-or for a break-even after covering financial costs. Subsidies that reduce the cost of fisheries operations and those that enhance revenues make fishing enterprises more profitable than they would otherwise be. This results directly or indirectly in the build-up of excessive fishing capacity, leading to the overexploitation of fishery resources. Therefore, the elimination of such subsidies, termed overfishing subsidies by Sumaila et al. (2007) , is crucial to our ability to manage fisheries sustainably through time.
"Self-subsidized" recreational fishing Herein, we argue that recreational fishing might be termed subsidized. However, not in the traditional way as for the commercial fishing sector, where subsidies are transferred from the government to the industry to maintain a break-even in a fishery that in reality is no longer economically viable. Recreational fishers, however, are subsidizing themselves through an economic investment from their earnings into their fishing activity (boats, gear, fuel, etc.) and through an indirect economical investment in time. Thus, we define a self-subsidized fishery as one in which fishers subsidize themselves through an economic investment in gear and time from their non-fishery-based earnings. Even though recreational fishers are a highly heterogenous group with regards to motivations and fishing methods, they all have in common that they transfer money and time into the fishing sector. As the value of recreational fishing is not directly linked to size and economic value of catch, there is a weak relationship between the willingness to invest in recreational fishing and the expected net catch value. If the experience value remains high, a recreational fisher might continue to "hunt the last fish." The self-subsidizing behaviour of recreational fishing has not been much explored but should be viewed as an important issue in the context of management of coastal fish resources. Studies have examined the motivations for and satisfaction of fishing (Holland and Ditton, 1992; Arlinghaus, 2006; Cooke et al., 2018) , the value of recreational fishing (Toivonen et al., 2004; Lawrence, 2005; Lovell et al., 2016; Hyder et al., 2018) as well as the impact and ecological effects of this activity (Schroeder and Love, 2002; Coleman et al., 2004; Cooke and Cowx, 2004; Lewin et al., 2006; Ihde et al., 2011; Fernández-Chacó n et al., 2017; Nillos-Kleiven et al., 2019) . These are all important factors for understanding the driving forces-and effects of the self-subsidizing behaviour of recreational fishers.
Regulating recreational fisheries through input control measures, such as open season duration and gear restrictions, have its limitations. This has been well demonstrated in the Gulf of Mexico red snapper fishery where the recreational fishing sector's adaptability to new regulations has led to a fishing season lasting for 9 days only in 2014 (Abbott et al., 2018) . Therefore, input control and effort regulations alone for the purpose of securing fish populations might be wrought with problems in a highly diverse and adaptable recreational fishery. Arlinghaus et al. (2019) suggested some solutions to the management challenges in recreational fisheries. An important point in their argument is that the quantity of recreational fishing privileges needs to be limited and in line with biological management targets. In our point of view, this needs to include output control, such as total allowable catch (TAC). Due to the innate self-subsidizing forces in recreational fisheries, there is reason to argue that TAC is even more important in recreational-than in un-subsidized commercial fisheries. However, incorporating TAC, including quota allocations, in recreational fisheries is not a straightforward process and might create resistance. Especially in open-access coastal fisheries where resources are shared with the commercial fishing sector (Borch, 2010) . To secure sustainability, there is an urgent need to impose management regulations that handle the self-subsidizing forces in the recreational fishery. This might not be possible without strong output controls, such as TACs. In the meantime, there are clear indications that recreational fisheries are increasing their relative impact on many over-harvested populations.
